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　Let me begin by extending a warm thank you to the Institute 
of Comparative Law in Japan for inviting me to speak today. I 
would also like to thank Professor Ito for inviting me to visit 
Chuo University as the host institution for my visit funded by 
the Australian Academy of Science, and Professors Okuda, Su-
zuki, Arai, and Rosen for their continued friendship and sup-
port for my research.
　My research focuses on welfare and social security as a new 
frontier in the trend of privatization and deregulation and its 
implications for law. As a comparative lawyer, I am very inter-
ested in how Japan meets the distinctive challenges that arise 
from rapid ageing. I consider ʻwelfare and social security lawʼ 
to include the law relating to the provision of welfare services 
and income, and supporting legal frameworks including sub-
stantive and procedural rights to challenge the welfare deci-
sions of agencies and laws enabling substitute decision mak-
ing. Welfare goals can also be promoted through traditional 
†　Presentation to the Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, 15 April 2015.
＊　Assistant Professor, Faculty of Business Government & Law, University of Can-
berra.
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private law concepts such as contract and negligence. Exam-
ples in Japan are contracts in child care, nursing care, educa-
tion, and private retirement pensions, where Professor Takashi 
Uchida and others have commented on the cross-fertilization 
of contract law and public law and public goals.1）
　Today I am going to focus on two specific issues and com-
pare approaches in Japan to that of common law jurisdictions, 
especially America and Australia. These issues are claims in 
negligence for accidents caused by persons with diminished 
mental capacity and voting rights for persons with diminished 
mental capacity. I will conclude that Japan has much to offer 
common law jurisdictions, but often due to its pragmatic or 
even extra-legal solutions to problems rather than legal solu-
tions and institutions per se.
Many of you will be familiar with this case. In 2007, a 91-year-
old man who suffered advanced dementia left his residence in 
Aichi Prefecture unnoticed by his wife, who had momentarily 
dozed off. An hour later, having managed to board a train at a 
nearby station, he entered the grounds of another railway sta-
tion and made his way through an unlocked gate to the tracks, 
where he collided with a passing train and was killed. In 2013, 
the Nagoya District Court held that the manʼs 85-year-old wife 
and his adult son were liable for economic harm (7.1 million 
yen) caused to the railway, mainly the costs associated with ar-
ranging alternate routes with different train companies for af-
1）　See Takashi Uchida, Institutional Contract Theory: Privatization and Contract 
(seidoteki keiyakuron: mineika to keiyaku) (Hatori Shoten, 2010); Trevor Ryan, 
ʻAdministering Welfare in an Ageing Societyʼ in Leon Wolff, Luke Nottage and 
Kent Anderson (eds), Who Rules Japan? (Elgar, 2015)
Case Studies in Welfare-Related Law
31
fected passengers.2） In 2014, the Nagoya High Court upheld 
the earlier ruling, albeit only with regard to the appellant wifeʼs 
liability, which was reduced by 50% due to contributory negli-
gence on the part of the respondent rail company.3）
　The estate of the deceased man was not held liable because 
he was found not to have had decision-making capacity. To 
soften the impact of this immunity on victims of harmful acts, 
Japanʼs Civil Code imposes liability on persons with a ʻlegal ob-
ligation to superviseʼ a person without capacity who has 
caused harm, or a person who has assumed supervision on 
their behalf.4）
　In common law jurisdictions like the United States and Aus-
tralia, mental incapacity is generally no defence to a claim in 
negligence unless there is sudden incapacitation, like a stroke 
or heart attack.5） The general justification for this has been 
that mental impairment is an idiosyncratic factor, that is, it is a 
characteristic of the defendant, like a personality trait.6） This 
differs from the approach taken to liability of minors, which in 
Australia at least, focuses much more on the particular level of 
development of the child than an objective standard for all chil-
2）　Judgment of the Nagoya District Court, 9 August 2013, Case No. 819 (wa) 
2010.
3）　Judgment of the Nagoya High Court, 24 April 2014, Case No. 752 (ne) 2013.
4）　Civil Code s 714.
5）　Vaughn E James, ʻNo Help For The Helpless: How The Law Has Failed To 
Serve And Protect Persons Suffering From Alzheimerʼs Diseaseʼ (2012) 7(1) Jour-
nal of Health & Biomedical Law 407, IIIB.
6）　Wendy Bonython, 'The Standard of Care in Negligence: The Elderly Defendant 
with Dementia In Australiaʼ (2011) 11(2) Canberra Law Review 119, 120.
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dren of a given age.7） Accordingly, there is no need for any vi-
carious family or carer liability. On the one hand, this seems 
inconsistent with the notion that liability follows fault. General-
ly we would say that a person without mental capacity is not at 
fault or otherwise responsible for their actions or capable of 
meeting a reasonable standard of care. Common law courts 
have instead prioritised policy reasons, for example where one 
of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne 
by the person who caused the loss.8） Another policy reason is 
that the common law approach might prevent false claims of 
incapacity and it might create an incentive for family members 
with a stake in a future inheritance to restrain and control 
members of their family who may pose a threat through be-
haviours such as wandering from dementia.9）
　Some commentators in America are critical of these justifi-
cations.10） In particular, it creates an incentive for family mem-
bers and carers to confine persons with mental disabilities. It 
also fails to take into account alternative forms of compensa-
tion.
　Policy reasons are also used to justify not imposing liability 
on caregivers. The United States law distinguishes between 
professional and informal caregivers. There are cases where 
7）　McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199.
8）　Edward P Richards, ʻPublic Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries 
Caused by Persons With Alzheimerʼs Diseaseʼ (2001) 35(1) Georgia Law Review 
621, 635.
9）　Ibid.
10）　Sarah Light, ʻRejecting the Logic of Confinement: Care Relationships and the 
Mentally Disabled Under Tort Lawʼ (1999) 109(1) Yale Law Journal 381, 389-90.
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the courts have imposed liability on institutions where a per-
son with a mental impairment is released and goes on to harm 
a third party, but only where there is specific evidence of the 
threat posed by release and only where the institution has the 
right and ability to control the person with the mental impair-
ment, for example dementia.11） The more common case is 
where a institution is found liable for harm to a staff member 
caused by a resident.12）
　The United States courts have been even more reluctant to 
impose liability on informal or family carers. In Emery v Little-
john, the Washington Supreme Court held that there was a 
general duty to the public on the part of a ʻprivate person hav-
ing the legal custody and control of a violently insane person 
with homicidal tendenciesʼ grounding liability for ʻwant of care 
and restraintʼ where there was clear evidence that dangerous 
behaviour was foreseeable.13） This is a very high threshold for 
liability. Furthermore, in Alva v Cook, the California Court of 
Appeal in finding family carers not liable for harm to a third 
party invoked the policy ground of not wishing to deter the al-
truistic behaviour of providing care to family members.14） Like 
the US cases of mental impairment, this creates a gap where 
victims have no redress, which seems inconsistent with the 
Japanese Civil Code approach of covering that gap with carer 
liability in section 714.
11）　See Garrison Ret. Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985).
12）　Light, above n 400.
13）　Emery v Littlejohn, 145 P. 423 (Wash. 1915).
14）　Alva v Cook, 123 Cal. Rptr. 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
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　It is possible to summarise from the United States case law 
that there is an underlying tension between policy goals that 
promote care-giving behaviour on the one hand and public 
safety on the other.
Returning to the 2014 Nagoya High Court case, the policy goal 
is clear: to ensure public safety through imposing liability on 
carers. The principle that a person without mental capacity to 
understand the consequences of his or her behaviour is also 
clear and defensible. However, the outcome was widely criti-
cised in the media and other quar ters on the following 
grounds.15） First, imposing liability upon a carer, who was her-
self requiring some degree of physical care and was exhausted 
from looking after her husband, was simply unfair. A second 
related criticism is that the court failed to understand the com-
plexity of caring for sufferers of dementia ─ which includes 
fluctuating capacity, challenging behaviours such as wander-
ing, and the resulting strain ─ and was therefore unrealistic in 
15）　See for example, ʻWhere is the Justice in The Decision? The Dementia Acci-
dent Caseʼ ([seigi] wa hanketsu no doko ni aru... ninchishoujiko soshou), Sankei 
News West, 31 May 2014; ʻFoundations of Duty to Supervise and Doubts: Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations Committee Chairman Kumada on the Dementia 
Train Accident Appealʼ (kantoku sekinin no konkyo, gimon, ninchishouresshajiko 
kousoshiin, nichibenren Kumada iinchou ni kiku), Tokyo Newspaper Online, above 
n; See, e.g., ʻNagoya High Court Reduces Damages Against Bereaved in Case 
Where Accident Caused by Dementia Wanderingʼ (ninchishou de haikai shi senro 
de jiko, izoku no baishou gengaku, nagoya kousai), Asahi News, 24 April 2014; The 
Japanese Society of Neurology, The Japanese Society of Neurological Therapeu-
tics, Japan Society for Dementia Research, Japan Geriatrics Society, the Japanese 
Psychogeriatric Society (Joint statement), ʻDeclaration on Train Accidents Involv-
ing Persons With Dementiaʼ (ninchishousha no tetsudou jiko ni kan suru seimei), 
10 April 2014 ︿http://184.73.219.23/rounen/pdf/ann_1404.pdf﹀.
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expecting 24-hour supervision. Third, the judgment also ig-
nores the problem of limited access to nursing care services. 
The waiting list for so-called ʻspecialʼ aged care nursing homes, 
entry to which has strict means and merits tests, has reported-
ly reached 500,000 people.16） Fourth, the result is inconsistent 
with official nursing care policy, which encourages at-home 
care because it is both a cheaper alternative to institutional 
care and an approach more consistent with normalisation for 
persons with disabilities. This is reflected in the statistic that, 
of the estimated 4.4 million sufferers of dementia in Japan, 2.8 
million access services under the new Long-Term Care Insur-
ance, and half of these reside in the community.17） The judg-
ment is inconsistent with this policy because it sends a mes-
sage that at-home care poses significant risks of liability for 
family carers. A simple reading of the case suggests that the 
message being sent is to seek institutional care or confine fam-
ily members within the home, using door locks, for example.
　At least with regard to this final point, the Japanese legal po-
sition sends precisely the same message to families that the 
common law approach does when it allows the estate to be 
sued. In other words, the message that the best way to avoid 
liability by ensuring the welfare of members of the public is to 
confine people with mental disabilities using locks and other 
restraints.
16）　ʻDementia Wandering Accidents: Towards a System of Support and Protection 
in the Communityʼ (ninchishou haikai jiko, chiiki de sasaeru mimamoru shikumi 
o), Kahoku News, 2 June 2014.
17）　The Japanese Society of Neurology, ʻDeclaration on Train Accidents Involving 
Persons With Dementiaʼ, above n .
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　It could be that the main factor that led to the negative me-
dia attention in the Japanese case was the question of whether 
a large, profitable railway was a deserving plaintiff. In future 
cases, the plaintiff could be a mere private individual, injured 
by a driver with dementia for example. The main problem is 
that the law of negligence is not particularly good at resolving 
disputes like this. Surely there is a better way of preventing in-
cidents like this and for providing compensation to parties 
who are injured without placing blame necessarily on carers or 
sufferers of dementia.
　One candidate is a cooperative insurance system. In many 
jurisdictions, it is already possible to contract for individual 
compensation liability insurance as part of motor vehicle or di-
saster insurance. However, some argue that risk-sharing re-
gimes at a public and community level, such as those that cur-
rently exist in some locations for incurring a disability, should 
be considered.18） This is because the commercial viability of 
private insurance schemes could be threatened if claimants in-
creased proportionately to the expected increase in dementia, 
which is after all a potential risk for every citizen. Since the 
case, the Japanese Ministry of Welfare has shown some indica-
tions that it is receptive to promoting and partially funding 
such proposals, depending on how the legal principles on neg-
ligence and carers are resolved when this case goes to the Su-
preme Court.19）
18）　Mizuho Research Institute, above n , 3.
19）　ʻDementia: Family Association Appeals for Compensation System for Train Ac-
cidents (ninichishou: ressha jiko no songai kyuusai seido o, kazoku ni kai ga 
moushiire)ʼ, Mainichi Shinbun, 23/05/2014,
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　Another candidate is creative solutions at a local govern-
ment or community level to deal with wandering. It seems 
clear that a cooperative system of prevention is needed. Police 
statistics for 2012 show that 9607 people with dementia were 
reported missing in Japan and 359 of these died, through acci-
dents or exposure.20） According to one newspaper, 100 people 
with dementia died in train accidents alone from 2005─2013.21） 
As an example of a cooperative preventative system, Fukuoka 
City has established a ʻwandering elderly search emailʼ system 
calling on citizens to assist in searching for missing persons.22） 
As of 2014, there were 2793 volunteers and 571 businesses 
registered. These proposals should be applauded and followed 
up with further public support to ensure their viability  and in-
stigation where they cannot easily be expected to emerge 
spontaneously at a community level.
　The lesson from this comparison is therefore that neither 
model, that is, neither the common-law model that imposes lia-
bility on persons with mental disabilities or the Japanese mod-
el that imposes liability on carers, is ideal either in principle or 
sound policy basis. The better approach is therefore to focus 
20）　ʻWhere is the Justice in The Decision? The Dementia Accident Caseʼ ([seigi] 
wa hanketsu no doko ni aru... ninchishoujiko soshou), Sankei News West, 31 May 
2014.
21）　ʻDementia: 115 Deaths from Railway Accidents, Also Compensation Claims 
against the Bereavedʼ (ninchishou: 115 nin tetsudou jikoshi, izoku ni baishou 
seikyuu mo), Mainichi Newspaper, 12 January 2014.
22）　ʻOrder for Compensation for Dementia Wandering Accident, Urgent Need for 
Approach Where Society Watches Overʼ (ninchishou haikai jikoshi ni baishou 
meirei, shakai de mimamoru taisei kyuumu), Nishi Nippon Newspaper, 1 January 
2014.
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on prevention and compensation rather than fault and we can 
see some developments in this area, though these perhaps 
need greater legislative and funding support from all levels of 
government.
　The second case I would like to discuss is another well-
known case in Japan. It is not directly related to an ageing soci-
ety, but is indirectly relevant to a society with increasing levels 
of dementia among the aged. In this case, the plaintiff was a 
woman named Takumi Nagoya, a Japanese citizen with Down 
Syndrome who, upon reaching the age of majority in 1982, 
consistently voted in elections until an order of adult guardian-
ship was issued by a Japanese family court in 2007. Nagoyaʼs 
father had taught Nagoya that voting was an important duty 
and she had diligently kept herself informed of the timing of 
elections. Although Nagoya could read and write at a basic lev-
el, she was weak with figures so her father applied for full stat-
utory guardianship because of an anxiety about her future 
shared by many ageing parents of adult children with disabili-
ties. Due to s 11 of the Public Office Electoral Act, Nagoyaʼs fa-
ther had unwittingly had her struck from the electoral roll 
upon the guardianship order being granted. With her fatherʼs 
assistance, and the support of a petition raising almost half a 
million signatures, Nagoya lodged an application to the Tokyo 
District Court for a declaration that the provision was uncon-
stitutional.
　The Tokyo District Court agreed, reasoning that given the 
fundamental importance of voting to popular sovereignty and 
representative democracy, the Constitution only sanctions re-
strictions on the vote that are necessary to ensure fair elec-
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tions.23） The adult guardianship system that formerly had as its 
purpose the protection of the property of persons deemed 
mentally incompetent has so fundamentally changed in con-
ceptual underpinnings that, even if the system had been an 
logical yardstick for disenfranchisement, this is no longer the 
case. These concepts of respect for autonomy, normalisation, 
and making use of remaining faculties were to be understood 
in light of domestic and international trends. This comparative 
approach also demonstrated the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives to guaranteeing the fairness of elections, such as 
more stringent policing of electoral fraud and measures to en-
sure that people with disabilities can be protected and support-
ed adequately in exercising their right to vote.
　In the wake of the case, a compromise was struck between 
the ruling coalition partners and the bureaucracy and the Pub-
lic Of fice Electoral Act was amended in May 2013.24） The 
amendment repealed the provision that disenfranchised the 
person on the basis of an adult guardianship order. It was de-
cided not to replace this with any general disqualification to 
vote on the grounds of lack of capacity to vote, though this 
would probably have satisfied the constitutional requirements 
of the judgment. Instead, the amendment introduced a new re-
gime that sought to balance a supported decision-making ap-
proach with safeguards against coercion. In other words, peo-
ple with both the physical and mental disabilities both at the 
23）　Judgment of the Tokyo District Court (14 March 2013).
24）　See Public Office Electoral Act s 48; Public Office Electoral Act Enforcement Or-
dinance (koushoku senkyohou shikourei), Ordinance 89 of 1950, ord. 50(5), 
56(4); Ministry of Internal Affairs Electoral Circular 46, 31 May 2013.
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ballot box and in institutions are given extra help to vote and 
this help is supervised.
　Interestingly, the Tokyo District Court referred to the Aus-
tralian system in its judgment. I would argue that the solution 
to the issue in Japan has leapfrogged the Australian position, 
because while Australia does not link guardianship orders to 
voting capacity, there is still a requirement in the Australian 
law that a person have the capacity to vote.
　Australia has been a pioneer in replacing courts with guard-
ianship tribunals, and this has tended to produce fewer and 
less invasive orders.25） On the issue of voting, Australia has 
been an early supporter of assisting those with disabilities to 
vote.26） Yet it has not gone as far as other jurisdictions in the 
protection of the political rights of persons with mental or in-
tellectual disabilities.
　Section 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
defines the franchise for Commonwealth Parliamentary elec-
tions. Section 93(8)(a) states that a person is disqualified from 
voting if he or she is: ʻA person who: (a)  by reason of being of 
unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and 
significance of enrolment and voting...ʼ Objections on this ba-
sis may be made (with a medical certificate) by any voter to 
another personʼs enrolment, to be determined by the Division-
25）　Terry R Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: Tribunals 
and Popular Justice (Federation Press, 1997) 2, 192.
26）　See Australian Electoral Commission, Report on performance: Assisting Aus-
tralians with Special Needs (Australian Electoral Commission, 2012): ︿http://an-
nualreport.aec.gov.au/2012/report-on-performance/australians/special-needs.
html﹀.
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al Returning Officer.27） An appeals may be made to the Austra-
lian Electoral Commission and then the Administrative Ap-
peals Tribunal.28）
　The ʻunsound mindʼ provision can be traced beyond Federa-
tion in the early 20th century. Despite judicial pronouncements 
that the Commonwealth provision ʻplainly is validʼ and that ʻthe 
rationale for excluding persons of unsound mind is obvious,ʼ 
the origins of the exclusion were rather arbitrary.29） The origi-
nal wording was that no vote would be permitted to a ʻperson 
who is of unsound mind or in the receipt of charitable relief as 
an inmate of a public charitable institution.ʼ The ʻcharitable re-
liefʼ clause was abandoned but reflected a broader debate with-
in society regarding the franchise and the moral and political 
status of those receiving welfare. The association of being of 
ʻunsound mindʼ and being in ʻreceipt of welfareʼ suggests that 
rather than a natural step, disenfranchising those with mental 
impairment seems to have evolved from anxieties about ex-
tending the franchise to a broader segment of society, includ-
ing the working class, women, Indigenous Australians, crimi-
nals, and the morally ʻundeser ving ʼ  such as ʻhabitual 
drunkardsʼ and those receiving social assistance.30）
　While these anxieties faded with the democratic develop-
ment of the franchise, it was criminals and ʻlunaticsʼ and ʻidiotsʼ 
(ie those of ʻunsound mindʼ) that continued to be excluded at 
27）　Commonwealth Electoral Act s 114, 118.
28）　Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) Part X.
29）　See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 10 April 1902, 11574-6.
30）　Regarding the development of the franchise regarding these groups in Austra-
lia, see Graeme Orr, The Law of Politics (The Federation Press, 2010) 46-49.
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both Commonwealth and State levels. Disenfranchisement of 
criminals in Australia has been constitutionally constrained at 
a federal level and voluntarily abandoned in some States. This 
is not the case for mental impairment, the last remaining sta-
tus-based disqualification other than citizenship and age.31）
　The issue of whether to revise the ʻunsound mindʼ provision 
in the Electoral Act has been considered at numerous forums 
in Australia. The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities has expressed concerns that ʻpersons with disabili-
ties, in particular those with intellectual or psychosocial dis-
abilities, are automatically excluded from the electoral roll.ʼ32） 
It recommends that Australia ʻrestore presumption of the ca-
pacity of persons with disabilities to vote.ʼ Other organisations 
have also criticised s 93(8)(a) on the grounds that it is ʻvague, 
stigmatising and overly broad, and does not reflect the true ca-
pacity of people with disabilities to make decisions about vot-
ing.ʼ33）
　A potential solution to the problem is to simply do what Ja-
pan has done and remove the disqualifying criterion altogeth-
er. In 2012, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
was charged with considering the merits of a bill that, among 
31）　Kay Schriner, Lisa A. Ochs and Todd G. Shields, ʻThe Last Suffrage Movement: 
Voting Rights for Persons with Cognitive and Emotional Disabilitiesʼ (1997) 27(3) 
Publius 75, 75.
32）　Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations 
on the initial report of Australia, adopted by the Committee at its tenth session (2013), 
[51].
33）　The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139, Australian Law Reform Com-
mission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 
24 (2014).
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other things, proposed to remove the reference to ʻunsound 
mindʼ and instead disqualify a person that ʻin the opinion a 
qualified person, is incapable of understanding the nature and 
significance of enrolment and votingʼ.34） The Bill defined ʻquali-
fied personʼ as a person who carries on, and is entitled to carry 
on, an occupation that involves the provision of care for the 
physical or mental health of people or for their well-being, and 
includes any of the following: (a) a medical practitioner; (b) a 
psychiatrist; (c) a psychologist; (d) a social worker.
　However, the effect would be that a personʼs voting rights 
could be removed much more readily, which is suggestive that 
the focus of the amendment was not on rights, but on paternal-
istically relieving persons with dementia from the burden of 
compulsory voting.
　The most recent round of this debate appears in the Austra-
lian Law Reform Commission inquiry Equality, Capacity and 
Disability in Commonwealth Laws.35） The Commission noted 
the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities in its initial issues paper.36） In its subse-
quent discussion paper, the Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion made three main proposals relating to s 93(8)(a). First, 
ʻunsound mindʼ would be dropped and the threshold for capac-
ity would be linked to a particular election, not enrolment and 
34）　See Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Improving Electoral Procedure) 
Bill 2012 Explanatory Memorandum.
35）　Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Com-
monwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 24 (2014).
36）　Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Com-
monwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 24 Issues Paper (2014).
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voting in a general sense.37） This would attempt to finally re-
move any sense that the exclusion was based on a ʻglobalʼ, 
once-off assessment of capacity amounting to a status.  Sec-
ond, the assessment of capacity would not be made indepen-
dent of support for decision-making. Third, ʻfurther guidance 
incorporating the National Decision-Making Principles would 
be available for medical practitioners and others undertaking 
assessments.ʼ These Principles are to ʻprovide a conceptual 
overlay, consistent with the Convention on the rights of Per-
sons with disabilities, that is applied in a Commonwealth deci-
sion-making model and provides the basis for review of rele-
vant Commonwealth, state and territory laws.ʼ38） They are in 
the main underpinned by a supported decision-making frame-
work that has developed alongside modern adult guardianship 
law.
　The Australian Law Reform Commission initially rejected 
proposals to delete the provision entirely and focus instead on 
a system of waivers for non-compliance with compulsory vot-
ing on the part of those with mental impairments. In arriving 
at this conclusion, the Commission cited concerns expressed 
by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, the 
Australian Electoral Commission, and the Australian Govern-
ment (in its Green Paper) that such a move would threaten the 
integrity of elections. In support of this point, the Commission 
cited Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJʼs view in Roach v Elec-
37）　Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Com-
monwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 24 Discussion Paper (2014).
38）　Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Com-
monwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 24 (2014) 9.
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toral Commissioner39） that s 93(8)(a) ʻplainly is validʼ because it 
ʻfor an end apt to protect the integrity of the electoral processʼ. 
The Commission even suggested that such a ʻcontroversial 
proposalʼ would change the nature of voting with implications 
beyond the Inquiryʼs terms of reference.
　My view on this is that the pragmatic Japanese solution is 
more consistent with the Convention on The Persons With 
Rights With Disabilities. My reasons are as follows. Underpin-
ning the Australian debate on this issue is a mistaken assump-
tion addressed by the Tokyo District Court that allowing peo-
ple with significant mental impairment to vote will impair the 
integrity of an election. First, as the Tokyo District Court not-
ed, there is no evidence in Japan at least of widespread fraud 
or coercion to influence the vote of persons with mental im-
pairments, at least to an extent that could affect the result of 
an election. I think the Australian purist position is that to al-
low a person without the capacity to vote to actually vote 
brings into disrepute the electoral process and its significance 
in a democratic society. The focus is on the perception of integ-
rity rather than any actual threat to the integrity of an election. 
However, this rests on the additional assumption that the ca-
pacity to vote can be defined. I agree with the Tokyo District 
Court, that the existing machinery that has been built around 
adult guardianship and the capacity to make decisions regard-
ing property does not tell us anything about whether some-
body has the capacity to vote. I think the best way of getting 
around this problem is to assume people who express a desire 
39）　(2007) 233 CLR 162.
比較法雑誌第49巻第 ₃ 号（2015）
46
to vote have the capacity to vote and then increase regulation 
to ensure that these people are not coerced into voting a par-
ticular way. Fortunately, after stakeholder consultation, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission has arrived at a solution 
similar to the Japanese position, albeit adjusted to take account 
of Australiaʼs system of compulsory voting.40）
　In conclusion, I think Japan has offered some very useful 
pragmatic solutions to legal problems that all societies share, 
especially ageing societies. In the first case, the negligence 
case, these solutions are extralegal cooperative solutions to 
problems that are not easily solved by the courts and instead 
focus on prevention first and then compensation. In the second 
case, the solution is also largely a pragmatic one that has re-
lied on abstract democratic principles to protect rights rather 
than effectively impose an onus on persons with mental dis-
abilities to demonstrate that they qualify as members of a polit-
ical community. There may be something about the Japanese 
legal tradition that is open to solutions beyond the law and so-
lutions that avoid strict adherence to idealistic principles 
where they ignore context.41） Whatever the origin, I have no 
doubt that there are mutual lessons to be learnt across Japan 
and the common law jurisdictions. Thank you.
40）　Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Com-
monwealth Laws, ALRC Inquiry 24 (2014) 262.
41）　Takao Tanase, Luke Nottage (trans) and Leon Wolff (trans), Community and 
the Law: a Critical Reassessment of American Liberalism and Japanese Modernity 
(Edward Elgar, 2010) 8. See also Zentaro Kitagawa, ʻDevelopment of Comparative 
Law in East Asiaʼ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Ox-
ford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 237.
